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SERVICE ON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

SERVICE ON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AFTER
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE STATE

Alvin E. Evans*
T MIGHT reasonably be expected in this corporate age that the
question of how service of process should be made upon foreign
corporations would have been solved, especially in situations where the
cause of action arose within the state and grew out of business done
there.1 Such is not the case, at least respecting suits brought after the
withdrawal of the corporation from the state on causes of action arising
during the period that it did business there. That there is a conflict in
the decisions seems to be due either to a difference inter se of the
statutes under which the action .arose or to a difference of interpretation
where the legislative intent is not made clear.

I

I
THE STATUTES

Some statutes make the appointment of an agent irrevocable, even
after the corporation has withdrawn from the state,2 so long as any
obligation arising during the period of doing business within the state
_is outstanding. A similar but better form of statute, which continues
liability to service for a stated period after withdrawal, was formerly
found in Texas.3
On the other hand, it is specifically stated in some state statutes

*

Dean of the University of Kentucky College of Law; A.B., Cotner; A.M.,
Nebraska; Ph.D., J.D., Michigan. Author of numerous articles published in legal
periodicals.-Ed.
1 lt seems probable that a statute is necessary, even in this simple situation, to make
it possible for an action to be brought elsewhere than in the state of incorporation. See
Germania Insurance Co. v. Ashby, II2 Ky. 303, 65 S. W. 6II (1901); Chicago &
Alton Ry. Co. v. Walker, 9 Lea (77 Tenn.) 475 (1882); I BEALE, CoNFLICT OF
LAws §§ 88.2, 91.4 (1935); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 519 (1839).
See FARNSWORTH, THE RESIDENCE AND DoMICILE OF CoRPORATIONS So (1939);
HENDERSON, THE PosITION oF FoREIGN CoRPORATioNs IN AMERICAN CoNsTITUTIONAL
LAW, c. 5,· "The Jurisdiction of the Courts over Foreign Corporations" at p. 77

(1918).
2

Generally, if a private agent is named and the agency is revoked, it must still
continue until another agent is named. See Reese Lumber Co. v. Licking Coal &
Lumber Co., 156 Ky. 723, 161 S. W. u24 (1914).
8
See note 19, infra. See also Green v. Endowment Association, 105 Iowa 628,
75 N. W. 635 (1898).
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that liability to service upon the agent required to be named shall continue so long as the corporation does business within the state. Here it
is not possible to interpret the statute as authorizing service after the
corporation has withdrawn,4 and the last form seems to be objectionable
for this reason.
Some statutes say nothing about the matter of service after withdrawal and there is consequently a conflict whether or not the action is
thereafter maintainable. Thus, in Kentucky there is a general provision
in the case of foreign insurance companies 5 that a corporation shall file
a written consent, authorized by a resolution of the board, for service
upon any agent of the corporation within the state or upon the commissioner of insurance, whose duty it is to send the summons by mail to
the company. The federal court for Kentucky has held that this statute
did not give authority for service of process aft~r the company had
withdrawn. 6 But, as this is a question involving the interpretation of a
state statute, such a holding by the federal courts was never binding on
the state courts even before the Erie Railway Co. v. Tompkins case.
It was soon thereafter repudiated in the state courts,1 which declared
4
See Mont. Rev. Codes (1907), § 4414; United Mo. River Power Co. v. Wisconsin Bridge Co., 44 Mont. 343, 119 P. 796 (1911). This provision was revised in 1931
so that a corporation is now required to consent to service on the secretary of state in suits
brought after withdrawal on causes of action arising during the period of doing business
within the state. See Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (1935), § 6661.1; Lathrop-Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Const. Co., (C.C.N.Y. 1907) 150 F. 666.
5
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942) § 296.200. Id. § 271.090 applies to corporations other
than insurance companies and requires that the foreign corporation shall have an authorized agent upon whom process can be served and that it shall be unlawful for a
corporation to carry on any business until it shall have filed in the office of the secretary
of state a statement signed by its president or secretary giving the name or names of its
agent or agents upon whom process can be served. If a change is made in its agent or
agents, the secretary of state shall be notified and the former agent shall remain agent
for the purpose of service until the appointment of a new agent is filed. Failure to·
comply with the provisions of the statute becomes a misdemeanor. See also, for fraternal
benefit societies, id; § 300.090. Foreign corporations engaged in real estate brokerage must consent to service upon the secretary of the Kentucky Real Estate Commission; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942), § 324.14-0.
6
Swann v. Mut. Etc., (C.C. Ky. 1900) 100 F. 922 (court speaks of the extorted
agreement of enforced appointment. The• license to do business had been revoked).
Friedman v. Empire Life Ins. Co., (C.C. Ky 1899) IOI F. 535. But there was the
same holding on this statute in De Castro v. Compagnie Etc., (C.C.N.Y. 1896) 76 F.
425, where the withdrawal was voluntary. See also Davis v: Kansas Etc. Coal Co.,
(C.C. Ark. 1904) 129 F.. 149. 7
Germania Ins. Co. v. Ashby, 112 Ky. 303, 65 S. W. 611 (1901) and International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 147 Ky. 564, 144 S. W. 1064 (1912). Commonwealth v. Provident S.L.A•.Soc., 155 Ky. 197, 159 S. W. 698 (1913). (Service on
i.nsurance commissioner after withdrawal, on liabilities arising within the state, is valid.
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that such an interpretation was not a necessary one and, if followed,
would render the statutory provision largely futile. 8 Other states have
agreed with the Kentucky reasoning, adding further that the remedy
provided at the time the consent was given is a part of the contract 9
between the state ~nd the corporation.
In still other states it is held that since service after withdrawal is
not provided for, such service, on a proper interpretation of the statute,
does not constitute due process.10 Thus, in Minnesota 11 it was recently
held that jurisdiction must exist when summons is served and that
jurisdiction does not continue after the withdrawal. There is an implication that a statute requiring consent to service upon an agent after the
withdrawal of the corporation would be unconstitutional. In fact, the
court went out of its way to reach this result when the holding could
have been based upon the simple fact that the alleged agent served,
though a subsidiary corporation, was not an agent.12 Such an interpretation is frequently based upon the presence theory, presence being held
to grow out of doing business.
Some of the incidental peculiarities of state statutes in regard to
service on foreign corporations are as follows:
Relatively few of these statutes provide expressly for service on
the. corporation after it has withdrawn from the state.13 Liability to
Company is still doing business when collecting premiums, even though it no longer
solicits insurance). In Reese Lumber Co. v. Licking Coal & Lumber Co., 156 Ky. 723,
161 S. W. II24 (1914), service on one who had been designated as agent but no longer
served in that capacity is good service, though he did not notify the corporation.
8 This position was sustained in American Railway Express Co. v. F. S. Royster
Guano Co., 273 U.S. 274, 47 S. Ct. 355 (1927). See also Davis v. Kansas & Texas
Coal Co., (C.C. Ark. 1904) 129 F. 149; Sydemann Bros., Inc. v. Wofford, 185 Ark.
775, 49 S. W. (2d) 363 (1932); Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§ 2248, 2250;
Meixell v. American Motor Co., 181 Ind. 153, 103 N. E. 1071 (1914); BrownKetchum Iron Works v. Swift, (Ind. App. 1913) 100 N. E. 584; Pervangher v.
Casualty Co., 81 Miss. 32, 32 So. 909 (1902); Groel v. United Electric Co., 69
N. J. Eq. 397, 60 A. 822 (1905).
9
Frazier v. Steel & Tube Co., IOI W. Va. 327, 132 S. E. 723 (1926); Billmyer
Lumber Co. v. Merchants Coal Co., 66 W. Va. 696, 66 S. E. 1073 (1910).
10
National Park Bank v. Concordia Land & Timber Co., 154 La. 31, 97 So. 272
(1923); Gouner v. Mo. Valley Bridge Co., 123 La. 964, 49 So. 657 (1909).
11
Garber v. Bancamerica-Blair Corp., 205 Minn. 275, 285 N. W. 723 (1939).
12
See also Forrest v. Pittsburgh Bridge Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1902) 116 F. 357;
Cady v. Associated Colonies, (C.C. Cal. 1902) I 19 F. 420. (But dictum that such
service is possible under apt legislation) .
18
For those which have such express provision see: Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
(1935), § 6661.1; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938), tit. 15, § 2852-I0II (so long as
any liability remains outstanding in the commonwealth); Tex. Stat. (Vernon, Supp.

' ,
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service is implied in some statutes.14 On the other hand, in some states
' the statute, either expressly or by implication, seems to exclude liability
to service after withdrawal.1° Seventeen jurisdictions have no such provision, express or implied.16 This leaves open the question how these
statutes are to be interpreted. Colorado, Montana, and Texas formerly
had.no such provision and courts of the last-mentioned state have held
that no suit was maintainable after withdrawal.11 The statute involved
in these decisions has very recently been changed, as has also a comparable statute of Montana. Two states provide for service by publication in such cases.18
A good many statutes de~lare that the liability to service shall continue after the corporation has surrendered its license to do business
or has withdrawn its agent, for such time as any obligation shall be outstanding, or for a fixed period.10
In addition to naming a list of corporat~ officers upon whom service
may be had; the statute often provides for alternative service on a
1943), § 2031a (Liability to suit continues aftei; withdrawal). Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann.
(Remington, 1932) § 3854.
14
Cal. Civil Code (Deering, 1941), § 406. See also §§ 406a, 406b, 411. Ill.
Rev. Stat. (Bar Assn. Ed., 1937), c. 32, § 157.111, Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935),
c. 32, § 157.11 I (Such authority is implied in the requirement made of the secretary
qf state to forward the notice if a local agent can't be found) ; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1933), § 25.313 (similar); Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1939), art. 23, § 118 (After withdrawal, may serve the last resident agent in the state) ; Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp.
I 940), § 749 5-13 (If corporation has withdrawn, serve secretary of state) ; Ohio Code
Gen. (Page, 1938), § 8625-20 (On surrender of license to do business corporation
must give secretary of state address where he may send notice of process).; Utah Code
Ann. (1943), § 18-8-1 (similar), or the converse is implied: Fla. Stat. (1941), § 47.39
(service on a foreign corporation now doing business within the state).
15
Fla. Stat. (1941), § 47.39 (provision for service o~ foreign corporations now
doing business within the state); N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913), § 7426, 1f 6.
16
Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Wyoming.
17
St. John v. Okla. Nat. Gas. Corp., (C.C.A. 5th, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 96.
18
Fla. Stat. (1941), § 47.39; Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939), § uo78.
19
Cal. Civil Code (Deering, 1941), § '411; Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935),
c. 87, § 20 (applies only to insurance companies); Idaho Laws, 1937, c. 133, p. 214
(continuation of liability implied); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), § 25.313; La.
Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 8625-21; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938), tit. 15, §
I 18 (continued liability implied); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (1935), § 6661.1; Ohio
Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 8625-21; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938), tit. 15, §
2852-1011. Texas: The former statute (Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) § 2031a) provides for four years. The more recent statute (Tex. Stat. (Vernon Supp., 1943) §
203 Ia) applies the. general statute of limitations. Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington,
1932), § 3854.
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private agent of the corporation,2° which may be made in some states
upon the agent who performed the act out of which the cause of action
arose, even though he is no longer an agent,21 and formerly in one
state upon a resident shareholder.22

II
THEORIES AS TO AUTHORITY FOR PROCESS

Several statutes indicate the theory upon which they were drawn,
i.e., the basis upon which a personal judgment against a foreign corporation may be obtained. Thus, they-frequently require the foreign
corporation to file a consent to be sued within the state. This consent is
likely to take the form of a resolution of the board of directors certified
and placed on file with the secretary of state.23 The submission theory
appears in some statutes.24 The Illinois statute adopts the constructive
presence theory.
There are, of course, three theories of control, the presence 25
theory, the consent theory and the theory that, since a foreign corporation can be prevented from entering the state altogether, it can be admitted on reasonable conditions. This latter view was put forth by
Judge Hand 26 and seems to be the one adopted by'the late Professor
Beale, which he calls the submission theory. 21 If the presence theory
were followed, it seems clear that jurisdiction could not be obtained
after withdrawal, even though the statute specifically provided therefor.
The consent theory is now regarded by Judge Hand and Professor
Scott and perhaps also by Beale, in his Conflict of Laws, as fictional.
' However, it does not seem necessarily to differ very materially from
the theory of conditional admission to the state. If a foreign corpora20

Ala. Code Ann. (1940), tit. 7, §§ 188, 192, 193.
La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart, 1939), §§ 1251, 1252; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie,
1938), § 8678.
22
Mills Colo. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1927), § 988.
23
Cal. Civil Code (Deering, 1941), § 405; Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935), c.
41, § II0; Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939), § 8355; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942), §
271 .090; Mont. 'Rev. Codes Ann. ( Courtwright, Supp. 1941) § 66 5l; Nev. Comp.
Laws (Supp. 1931-1941), § 8580; N.D. Laws, 1937, c. u6, § 13; Utah Code Ann.
(1943), §§ 18-8-1, 82-1-12; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933), § ;974; Wis. Stat. (1941),
§ 226.02; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 3854.
24
N.C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1939), § II37; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938), tit.
15, § 2852-IOII; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1937), § 3083.
25
See e.g., Anderson-Oliver v. U.S. Fidelity Co., 174 N.C. 417, 93 S.E. 948
(1917).
25
Smolik v. Philadelphia etc. Iron Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1915) 222 F. 148 at 151.
27
I BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 89.9 (1935).
21
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tion, knowing fully the terms of the local statute, determines to do
business under the named restrictions, it is difficult to say that it does
• not consent to theni. This would be comparable to the case where a
beneficiary of a legacy, devisee under a will or grantee in a conveyance
imposing certain conditions upon the beneficiary or grantee accepts the
devise or grant made to him. It seems fair to say that the devisee or
grantee also assents to the conditions under which the devise or grant
is made.
·
Some commentators, misled, as it would seem, by the consent
theory, have urged that the statute should clearly state that the corporation's .assent is required.28 Thus, it is considered that a statute like
that in Kentucky, above mentioned, requiring the corporation to file a
"resolution adopted by its board of directors consenting to s~rvice of
process.up'on any agent" makes the consent of the corporation obeying it
clearly necessary.· The precise form of the statute is probably not
material and a statute providing for service upon a state officer without
the filing of such consent should have the same effect. If provision is
not expressly made for service after the corporation'~ withdrawal, then
th~ question whether such method of service is sufficient after the corporation has withdrawn depends on the interpretation of the statute
anq. the legislative intent. It is, of course, far better that the statute be
specific with respect to the period in which service is to be made.
The importance of the effect to be given to the wording of the
statute respecting the character of the agent on whom service may be
made is shown in many ways. Thus, under the old N ~w York statute
not only must the corporation be doing business at the time of suit but
the agent must be the one who had direction of the business out of which .
the suit arose. 20 This illustrates one of the defects of the earlier statutes.
Conditions are likely to change so that under such a law an action might
become impossible. The difficulty was perhaps avoided in Mississippi
by the fiction of assuming that the agent served was the one who solicited the business out of which the action grew.80 Under the later New
York statute it was held that in order to have service on an actual agent,
though not the one provided for under the statute, the company must
be presently doing business within the state at the time of suit. The
theory seems to be that while the corporation does business it consents
to service on any agent but after it has withdrawn it consents only to
28

See., e.g., 6 M1cH. L. REV. 506 (1908).
St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 1 S. Ct. 354 (1882).
80
Pervanger v. Surety Co., 81 Miss. 32, 32 So. 909 (1902).

29
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such service as the statute requires. 31 The majority of states permit the
corporation to name its agent ( a private one) for service. It has been
held, however, that service on another person who is in fact an agent
is sufficient under the statute,32 as is also service on a special agent sent
to settle the dispute.8 8
It was once the view in a few states that their statutes, literally
interpreted, permitted service on a foreign corporation by service on any
responsible agent such as the president or vice-president, though he was
only temporarily within the state and though the corporation either was
not at the time doing business or had never done business therein.
That is, suit was authorized against a foreign corporation on a transitory
cause of action arising elsewhere if any agent could be found within the
state. This would discard the presence, the consent, and the submission
theories as if none of them were nec;essary under the statute.8"' Most
courts, including the federal courts, do not now so interpret the
statute.35 It might be observed that where service is had on a president,
vice-president or general manager, wherever he may be found, notice
is most likely to come to the corporation and thus it would have a chance
to be heard. Yet great hardship might well accrue to it either because of
the difference in the local law or because of the inconvenience in defending a suit at a place where the corporation has no other interest.
This latter reason may well be the ground for the formula respecting
the effect of doing business within the state. It would also conflict with
the theory as to the place where a corporation exists as an entity.
The necessity for notice seems scarcely to be provided for under a
decision in South Carolina which permitted a copy of the summons to be
left at the place of business of the former agent after the corporation
had withdrawn, the agent himself not being found. 36 In New Jersey
service on a resigned agent was held sufficient in the particular case
because plaintiff had no knowledge of the termination of the agency.
This also seems to be a questionable rule if, in fact, the statute requires
service to be made upon one who actually represents the corporation at
31

Kellogg & Co. v. Barrett, (Sup. Ct. 1930) 240 N.Y.S. 824Lesser Cotton Co. v. Yates, 69 Ark. 396, 63 S. W. 997 (1901).
83
Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 19 S. Ct. 308 (1898).
8
"' In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Weeks, (C.C.A. 5th, 1918) 254 F. 513,
service was had on a general manager of defendant permanently located in the state
but corporation did no business there and the cause of action arose outside ~e state.
85
See e.g., Zelnicker Co. v. Miss. Co., (Mo. Ct. App. 1903) 77 S. W. 321;
Aldrich v. Anchor Coal Co., 24 Ore. 32, 32 P. 756 (1893).
86 Terry Packing Co. v. Southern Express Co., I 25 S. C. 198, II 8 S. E. 628
(1923). See, to same effect, Maine statute, Me. Rev. Stat. (1930), c. 95, § 19.
32
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the time. There is no assurance that notice will be forwarded in such a
situation.37 The case seems different where the statute expressly provides in the alternative for service on a former agent. The corporation
with knowledge of such a statute can take at least some precautions in
order that it may receive notice of the action. If, however, the statute
requires service upon an agent, service upon a former agent is insufficient.38 If he must be a resident agent, service on a non-resident, traveling agent within the state is not good. 39 Service upon a director after the
.corporation has withdrawn does not seem to be inadequate since his
interest in the affairs of the corporation continues.40 Sometimes a· director or stockholder is by statute made an agent for service.

III
THE AGENT

It is better to require service to be made upon a state officer and to
provide that he shall communicate with the corporation by letter put
in the mail or p(?ssibly by telegraph. It is hardly probable that the defendant will fail to .receive the notice in that case. But if the statute does
not require the officer to give such notice he probably will not do so and
it is likely that notice will never be received. While some courts may
hold that i1_1 the particular suit the corporation is bound by a personal
- judgment on the-ground that it has actually assented to such substitutedservice, the practice of serving a state officer who is not required to forward notice of it may often sanction personal judgments against defendants who have never had notice nor a chance to be heard. If the
doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff, that a personal judgment must be based
upon personal service within the state where the acti9n is brought, applies to corporations and is to be broken in upon in the manner just
described, then .perhaps there should be some relaxation of it in the
case of individual defendants', if they have received actual notice given
· in some way other than in the present statutory fashion. The requirement of service upon a state officer exclusively eliminates all difficult
Moulin v. Trenton Mutual Ins. Co., z5 N.J.L. 57 (1855).
Guthrie v. Conn. Mut. Indem. Assoc., IOI Tenn. 643, 49 S. W. 82.9 (1899).
ScoTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE 56 (19zz), develops the three theories of
jurisdiction.
·
39 Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Turner, 88 Tenn. z65, IZ S. W. 544 (1889).
40 Boggs v. Inter-American Co., 105 Md. 371, 66 A. z59 (1907), and see International Harvester Co. v. Ky., z34 U.S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 859 (1914). Service on a
stockholder was formerly provided for in Colorado.
37

38

.
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issues as to what person can be regarded as an agent. Surely a carpenter
or ditch digger employee ought not to be regarded as an agent, partly
because he is not likely to forward the notice. Such a requirement would
also eliminate even an officer of the corporation as a suitable person on
whom service should be made in a case where the claim against the
.corporation was his own and he had assigned it in order to make possible
service upon himself as agent. 41 There is no sound objection to the appointment of a state officer, even when a managing agent is domiciled
within the state.
·
There is a further difficulty respecting the appointment of a private
agent whether or not alternative service upon a state officer is provided.
The private agent may die, resign, move away, become incompetent, or
acquire an adverse interest in the subject matter of the litigation. If
the appointment should not be irrevocable or made to endure until a
new agent is named, no service would be possible in these contingencies
( where the alternative of a state agency is not provided), even though
liability to service were made to continue so long as any obligation
arising from doing business in the state should be outstanding. The
cases holding that service on an agent who has moved away and happens
to return on his own business is sufficient, and those holding that service
can be had, on an officer who merely happens to be within the state at
the time, are questionable with respect to the matter of the right to
notice and an opportunity to be heard.42 There seems to be no objection,
however, to extending the right to serve the agent to causes of action
that arose before the right to serve the agent was created.43
As for causes of action arising within the state but out of interstate
commerce, it is now definitely held that a state statute may appropriately authorize service within the state.44 Presumably service could also
be had on the corporation after its withdrawal under an appropriate
statute. A close question may arise as to where the transaction occurred.
Thus, in Paulus v. Hart-Parr Co.,45 an action on a contract made in
41

See Tortat v. Hardin Co., (C.C.S.D. 1901) I I I F. 426, and see on the
problem of the character of the agent, Culp, "Constitutional Problems Arising from
Service of Process on Foreign Corporations," 19 MINN. L. REv. 375 at 383, n. 33
(1935).
42
Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 15 S. Ct. 559 (1895) and Meixell
v. American Motor Car Sales Co., 181 Ind. 153, 103 N.E. 1071 (1914).
43
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Duerson, 28 Gratt. (69 Va.) 630 (1877).
44
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937), § 1368. Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929), § 24-1201.
But see Cal. Civil Code (Deering, 1941), § 407 (statute does not apply to corporations
engaged in interstate commerce only).
45
136 Wis. 601, II8 N. W. 248 (1908).
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Iowa for the shipment of an engine from Iowa to Wisconsin, it was
held_ that the action could be brought in Wisconsin, though the statute
limits suits against foretgn corporations to cases arising within the state,
it being held that the breach occurred in Wisconsin.
A further question often arises which, for the purpose of this discussion, is not very important. It is, may either residents or non-residents sue und~r such a statute (providing for service on a state officer,
notice of which he is required to forward) on a cause of action arising
outside the state? Some statutes expressly limit suits against foreign
corporations to causes arising within the state.46 Two expressly permit
the action to be brought by a non-resident upon a transitory cause of
action arising elsewhere,47 while others require plaintiff to be a resident
or the cause of action to have arisen within the state.48 Thus, in two
states residence of plaintiff outside the state is of itself not determinative of his right to sue.49 As to such actions where there is no such limitation stated,5° some commentators are of the opinion that the matter
has not been clearly decided by the Supreme Court on the que~tion of
due process. However, it·has been held that "the purpose in requiring
the appointment of such an agent is primarily to ~ecure local jurisdiction
·in respect of business transacted within the state, and that it is unreasonable and unfair to permit suits on all transitory causes of action to be
commenced within a state after the foreign corporation has ceased to do
business therein." 51
There is no consistency with respect to which officer of the state shall
serve as agent. Thus:
46
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935), c. 87, § 20 (insurance companies-by inference); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), § 25.313; N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 19411942), § 2:26-47; N.C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1939), § 483; Ohio Gen. Code (Page,
1938), § 8625-21; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932), § 3854.
47 Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1933), § 22-1101; Miss. Code Ann. (1930), § 4166.
See Vicksburg S. & P.R. Co. v:. Forcheim~r, 113 Miss. 531, 74 So. 418 (1917).
48
N.C. Code Ann (Michie, 1939), § 483.
49
Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1933), § 22-1101; N.C. Code (Michie, 1939), § 6415.
50 See Culp, "Constitutional Problems Arising from Service of Process on Foreign
Corporations," 19 MrnN. L. REV. 375 at 396 (1935).
51 Mitchell Furn. Co. v. Selden Breck. Construction Co., 257 U.S. 213 at 215, 42
S. Ct. 84 (1921). In Am. Ry. Exp. Co. v. Rouw Co., 173 Ark. 810, 294.S. W. 401
(1927), the shipping contract in interstate commerce was made in Missouri and was
breached in Michigan. Under the statute plaintiff, being a resident, may sue, inasmuch as the corporation does business within the state. But there is no right of action
if plaintiff, under such circumstances, is a non-resident. See Davis v. Farmers Coop.
Co., 262 U.S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556 (1923).
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(a) One state specifically provides that no state officer shall act as
agent for service for a foreign corporation.52
(b) In several states there is no provision for service on a state official, hence none is permissible. 58
( c) In several states foreign corporations are required to appoint
some state official as agent for service.54
52

Ariz. Code Ann. (1939), § 53-305.
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937), § 1368; Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935), c. 41,
§§ 110, I I I (except in the case of insurance companies); Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930 ), §
5469; D.C. Code (1940), §§ 13-103, 13;-104; Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1933), §
22-1 IOI; Kan. Rev. Stat. (1935), §§ 60.2419, 60.2520, 60.2522; Ky. Rev. Stat.
(1942), §§ 302.100, 324.140 (as to all corporations save insurance companies and
real estate brokerage companies); Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1939), art. 48A, § 172
(similar to Kentucky); Miss. Code Ann. (1930), § 4167; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939),
§ 880; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (Courtwright, Supp. 1939), § 6651, Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann. (1935) § 6661.11 (5) (Except after withdrawal when secretary of state is made
agent in some situations); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938), c. 116, §§ i6, 64-70; Va.
Code Ann. (Michie, 1942), §§ 3845, 6064, 6064a, 6065, 6066.
54
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935), c. 87, § 20 (In case of insurance companies,
insurance commissioner must be named. No provision made for naming any state
officer in other cases); Idaho Laws, 1937, c. 133, p. 214 (after corporation has surrendered its license to do business); Ill. Acts, 1939, c. 60, p. 407 (where corporation
does business without a license); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), §§ 25.310, 25.313
(where corporation has withdrawn or its license has been revoked); Iowa Code
(Reichmann, 1939), § 8420; Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1939), Art. 48A, § 172 (In
case of insurance companies, company must appoint commissioner of insurance as
agent for service); Mass. Gen. Laws (1932), c. 181, § 3; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929),
§ 14096, Stat. Ann. (1938), § 27.763 (Insurance companies must appoint commissioner of insurance, secretary of state, or other state officer); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
( 193 5), § 666 I. I ( which states that after the corporation has surrendered its license to
do business service can be had only upon a state officer); Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp.
1931-1941), § 8581; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942), c. 280, §1, c. 325, §10 (Corporations other than insurance companies must appoint secretary of state. Insurance companies must appoint insurance commissioner); N.C. Code (Michie, 1939), §§ 1137,
6414 (Serve secretary of state where no agent appointed or insurance commissioner, in
c!ase of insurance companies. Three ways for service on insurance companies, see id. §
483); N.D. Laws, 1937, c. n6, § 13, N.D. Laws (1913) § 7426, W5 (Must appoint secretary of state where there is a failure to appoint private agent or its license is
revoked or it has withdrawn. Insurance companies must appoint secretary of state in
all events); Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 8625-20 (Serve secretary of state after
corporation has surrendered its license); S.C. Code (1942), § 7765 (Serve secretary
of state if no agent designated but in case of insurance companies, serve insurance
commissioner); S.D. Code (1939), § II.2108 (Serve secretary of state only); Tex.
Stat. (Vernon, Supp. 1943), § 2031a (where no license obtained, must appoint secretary of state); Vt. Acts, 1937, No. 40, p. 69 (any act of foreign corporation within state
is construed as an appointment of the secretary of state as agent for service); Va. Code
Ann. (Michie, 19-4-2) § 6064 (must serve the secretary of state); Wis. Stat. (1941),
58
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( d) Provision for alternative service on some state officer is mad,e
in a considerable number of states.55
Where service is on an agent or alte;natively upon a state officer, .
several states require a showing of diligence to be made in the retu_rn
o.f the officer respecting the effort made to find the private agent. 56
In case of appointment of state officers as agents, the one most com. monly selected is the secretary of state.57 He is the ~xclusive agent in
Vermont. 58 Others named are: the commissioner or superintendent of
§§ 215.41 (3), 226.02 (Some corporations must appoint the commissioner of banking,
others the secretary of state) .
55 Ala. Code Ann. ( I 940), tit. 7, §§ I 8 8, 192, I 93; Cal. Civil Code (Deering,
1941) § 406a; Del. Rev. Code (1935), § 2080; Fla. Stat. (1941), § 47.36; Idaho
Code Ami. (1932), § 5.507 (3). Ill. Rev. Stat. (Bar Assn. Ed., 1937), c. 32, §
157.n1, Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), c. 32, § 157.1n; Iowa Code (Reichmann,
1939), § 8355; La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart, 1939), § 1248; Md. Code Ann. (Flack,
1939), art. 48A, § 172 (in the case of insurance companies); Mich. Comp. Laws
(1929), §§ 14095, 14096, Stat. Ann. (1938), §§ 27.762, 27.763 (in the case of
insurance companies); Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1940), § 7495-13; Miss. Code
Ann. (1930), § 4167; N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1941-1942), § 2:26-47; N.M. Stat.
Ann. (1941), § 19-306; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1931-1941), § 8581; Thompson's
Law of N.Y. (1939), Part II, p. 1649, § 229, Con. Laws (McKinney, 1929), § 22210 as amended by N.Y. Laws, 1935, c. 471; N.C. Code (Michie, 1939), §§ II37,
6414; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 8625-19; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938), tit.
15, § 2852-1on; S.C. Code (1942), § 7765; S.D. Code (1939), § 11.2108; Tenn.
Code Ann. (Michie, 1938), § 4124; Tex. Stat. (Vernon, Supp. 1943), § 2031a; Vt.
Pub. Laws (1933), § 1522; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932), § 3854;
W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1937), §§ 3083, 4937, 4938, 5539,
56
Among them are Cal. Civil Code (Deering, 1941), § 406a. The present Florida Statutes (1941) omit the requirement of diligence in § 47.36, which showing was
required in the earlier statutes; Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws Ann. (Skillman, 1927), § 4264La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart, 1939), § 1248; Miss. Code' Ann. (1930), § 4166; Nev.
Comp. Laws (Supp. 1931-1941), § 8581.
57
Ala. Code Ann. (1940), tit. 7, §§ 188, 192, 193; Cal. Civil Code (Deering,
1941), § 406a; Del. Rev. Code (1935), § 2080; Ill. Rev. Stat. (Bar Assn. Ed., 1937),
c. 32, § I 57.II 1, Stat. Ann. (Smith.:.Hurd, 1935), c. 32, § 157.II I ; Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1933), § 25.310; Iowa Code (1939), § 8355; La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart,
1939), § 1248; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), § 14095, Stat. Ann. (1938), § 27.762;
Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1940), § 7495-13; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (1935), §
6661.1; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942), c. 280, § 1; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1931-1941),
§ 8581; N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1941-1942) § 2:26-47; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941), §
19-306; Thompson's Laws of N.Y. (1939), Part II, p. 1649, § 229, Con. Laws (McKinney, 1929) § 22-210 as amended by N.Y. Laws, 1935, c. 471; N.C. Code
(Michie, 1939), § II3J; N.D. Laws, 1937, c. u6, § 13; Ohio Gen. Code (Page,
1938), § 8625.19; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1936), tit. 15, § 2852-lOII; S.C. Code
(1942), § 7765; S.D. Code (1939), § 11.2108; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938),
§ 4124; Tex. Stat. (Vernon, Supp. 1943), § 2031a; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933), § 1522.
58
Vt. Acts, 1937, No. 40, p. 69.
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insurance,5° the commissioner of banking,6° the commissioner of corporations,61 the director of the securities commission,62 the state auditor, 68 the county auditor, 64 the circuit clerk,65 any public officer desig- ,
nated by the corporation.66
Where the service is on a state officer, some statutes make no provision for forwarding notice. This seems to have been the earlier
practife. 67 Now it is common to require notice of process to be sent to
the home office but the manner is sometimes not stated, or it is required
to be sent by mail, either registered, 68 or unregistered,69 or by telegraph, 70 or both by telegraph and registered mail.

IV
FOREIGN CAUSES OF ACTION

Where an action on a foreign cause is brought in the federal courts,
there is now some authority that it will lie. Thus, in Morrell 'V. United
59
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935), c. 87, § 20; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942) §
296.200; Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1939), art. 48A, § 172; N.C. Code (Michie,
1939), § 6414; S.C. Code (1942), § 7964.
60
Wis. Stat. (1941), § 215.41 (3).
61
•
Mass. Gen. Laws (1932), c. 181, § 3; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940), §
77-J0l.
62
Utah Code Ann. (1943), § 82-1-12.
68
Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929), § 24-1201; W. Va. Code (Michie, 1937), §§
4938, 4937 (d).
64
Idaho Code Ann. (1932), § 5.507 (3).
65
Fla. Stat. (1941), § 47.36, 47.37-47.39, 48.07.
66
Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), § 14094, Stat. Ann. (1938), § 27.761; Thompson's Law of N. Y. (1939), Part II, p. 1649, § 229, Con. Laws (McKinney, 1929),
§ 22-210 as amended by N.Y. Laws, 1935, c. 471.
67
See 89 A. L. R. 658 (1934).
68 Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935), c. 87, § 20 (postpaid); Ill. Rev. Stat. (Bar
Assn. Ed., 1937), c. 32, § 157.1u, Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), c. 32, § 157.u1;
Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1940), § 7495-13; Miss. Code Ann. (1930), § 4167;
N. H. Rev. Laws (1942), c. 280, § 6 (prepaid postage); Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp.
1931-1941), § 8581; S.C. Code (1942), § 7765; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938),
§ 4124 (must require return receipt); Utah Code Ann. (1943), § 82-1-12.
69
Fla. Stat. (1941), § 47.36; Idaho Code Ann. (1932), § 5.507 (3) (failure
to forward shall not affect validity of service); N.H. Rev. Laws (1942), c. 280, § 6
(postage prepaid); N.C. Code (Michie, 1939), § 6415; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1940), § 77-301 (postage prepaid)·; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933), § 1523; Wis. Stat.
(1941), § 215.41 (3) (by letter).
7
°Cal. Civil Code (Deering, 1941), § 406a (charges prepaid); N.M. Stat. Ann.
(1941), § 19-306 (charges prepaid); Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 8625-19
(notice both by telegram and registered mail).
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Air Lines et al, 11 plaintiff administrator appointed in New York sued
defendant, a Delaware corporation, for the wrongful death of her intestate. His death was caused in Ohio. Service was had on the New York
agent of defendant. Defendant Air Lines Company summoned the
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, a Pennsylvania company, as third party
defendant by similar service upon the latter's New York agent. The
claim arose out of an injury arising from allegeq. defective aircraft
construction, which wrong was committed elsewhere than in New York.
The Bethlehem Steel Company unsuccessfully moved to set aside the
service on the ground of improper venue. Thus, two foreign corporations, one chartered in Delaware and the other in Pennsylvania, were
held to answer to the plaintiff's claim in a New York court on a cause
of action arising in Ohio.
So in N eirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co. 72 plaintiffs, citizens
of New Jersey, brought an action against defendant corporation chartered in Delaware. The service was made on defendant's New York
agent. The court declared that the sole question was whether the provisions of section 5 I of the Judicial Code 7~ are satisfied by service upon
the agent of a foreign corporation in a case where it has named such an
agent for service of process in conformity with the law of the state in
which suit is brought. It was held that the privilege accorded by this
section of_ the code was waived positively by consent to be sued, and by
compliance with the sfatutory requirement of the state that an agent be
, appointed for service of process. Thus, presumably plaintiff is not
limited to causes of action arising within the state,74 where the action is
brought in the federal courts.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that in either of the above
cases it would have been held that the venue was appropriate if the
corporation had withdrawn from the state before suit had been begun.
It would seem that in this event the so-called waiver in the latter case
would itself have been withdrawn before it had been acted upon -and we
may surmise also that the action based on diversity of citizenship in the
Morrell case would have required a different forum.
71

(D.C.N.Y., Oct., 1939) 29 F. Supp. 757. For the application of the federal
rules of procedure to third party proceedings as ancillary with respect to jurisdiction.
See IO A1R LAW RE\,:. 422 (1939); 24 MINN. L. REv. 437 (1940); 26 VA. L. REV.
376 (1940).
72
308 U.S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153 (1939).
73
7 F.C.A., tit. 28, § 112.
74
7 UNiv.-Cm. L. REv. 397 (1940); 49 YALE L. J. 724 (1940).
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V
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CORPORATIONS

In many states there is no express provision for service on foreign
corporations, but it is commonly held that a statutory provision for
service on corporations applies. to both domestic and foreign corpora.:
tions. 75 In a larger number the statute expressly applies to foreign corporations.
.
If service after withdrawal is appropriate, as it has been held to be,
one wonders why insurance companies have been picked out for special
treatment. It may be trµe that the problem arises more often in connection with insurance business; but, if the statute is valid and appropriate in insurance cases, it is clearly valid with reference to all foreign
corporations that are doing or have done business within the state.76
This distinction respecting foreign insurance companies and other foreign corporations is made in a good many states. 77 Thus, in Kentucky,
the principal section dealing with the matter is made applicable to all
foreign corporations save insurance companies and real estate brokerage companies. The only di:fference is that no provision is made for
service on a state officer save in the case of insurance companies, which
75
Ariz. Code Ann. (1939), §§ 53-305, 21-313, 21-314; Conn. Gen. Stat.
(1930), § 5469 (Foreign corporations are mentioned to the effect that they may be
served); Del. Rev. Code (1935), § 2080; Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1933), § 22-1101;
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939), § 880; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929), § 24-1201; Thompson's Laws of N. Y. (1939), Part II, p. 1649, § 229, Con. Laws (McKinney, 1929),
§ 22-210 as amended by N.Y. Laws, 1935, c. 471; Okla. Stat. (1941), tit. 12, §§
163-167; Tenn. Cocte Ann. (Michie, 1938), § 4124; Wyo. Rev. Stat. (Courtwright,
1931), §§ 89-814, 89-816.
76
See Culp, "Constitutional Problems Arising from Service of Process on Foreign
Corporations," 19 MINN. L. REv. 275 at 378-380, ns. 13, 14. Florida provides for
service on the agent of a c,orporation whose name must be forwarded to the secretary
of state. The agent also must file his acceptance of the agency for process, Fla. Stat.
(1941), § 47.35, and in the alternative the clerk of a circuit court may be designated,
id. § 47.36. But this whole provision for service on foreign corporations has little
significance in view of id. § 47.45, which exempts some sixteen types of corporations
from its term~.
77
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935), c. 87, § 20; Kan. Rev. Stat. (1935), §
60.2523; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942), § 302.100; Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1939), art.
48A, § 172; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930), c. 95, § 22; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), §
14096, Stat. Ann, (1938), § 27.763; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (Courtwright, Supp.
1939), § 6651; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929), § 24-1201; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937), §
2-26-53.
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must alternatively appoint the insurance commissioner as agent. 7 8 In a
few cases other kinds of foreign corporations are singled out for special
treatment. 7 9 In Wisconsin a distinction is made as to building and loan
associations. 80
CONCLUSION

There should no longer be a doubt that a state may validly require
a foreign corporation to be subject to service of_process upon obligations
created within the state, after it has withdrawn from the state. Any
decisions to the contrary due to the presence or consent theories are no
longer tenable. The great variations in the decisions are likely to be
based, however, quite as much upon the variations in the statutes as
upon any constitutional theory of due process. Recent statutes show
•that this problem was formerly realized dimly, or not at all, but that a
' process of education has been going on. Most courts, however, without
a special provision thereto, will probably hold that liability of a corporation to service after withdrawal is implicit in the fact that it has
elected to do ·business within the state unless the statutory language
negatives such an implication. The presence theory and even the consent theory has, in the past, had the unfortunate result that no action
could be brought within the state after the withdrawal of the corporation. To select the insurance companies for special treatment or, for that
matter, any others, such as banking, bridge, brokerage, building and
78
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942), §§ 271.090, 302.100.. See Cal. Civil Code (Deering,
1941), § 405; Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935), c. 87, § 20 (Insurance companies

must name commissioner of insurance as agent for service. In other cases, plaintiff may
serve an agent or in the alternative, a stockholder); Kan. Rev. Stat. (1935), § 60-2523
(Serve alternatively the superintendent of insurance. No service on state officer provided
in other cases); Mass. Gen. Laws (1932),. c. 223, §§ 38, 39 (unimportant distinctions); Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), §§ 14094, 14095, 14096, 14097, Stat. Ann.
(1938), §§ 27.761, 27.762, 27.763, 27.764 (Insurance companies may appoint
alternatively the insurance commissioner or the secretary of state or other state officer
but must appoint alternatively.a private agent for service); Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929),
§ 20-513 (no important distinctions); N.H. Rev. Laws (1942), c. 280, §§ 1, 2, 6
'(Insurance compani~s must appoint commissioner of insurance, others must appoint
secretary of state); N.C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1939), §§ u37, 6414 (Service in case
of foreign insurance companies must be on insurance commissioner. In other cases,
service may be alteriiatively on a private agent).
·
79
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942), § 324.140 (real estate brokerage companies);. Mass.
Gen. Laws (1932), c. 181, § 3 (bridge, railway and highway companies); Wis. Stat.
(1941), §§ 215-41 (3), 226.02 (7) (banking corporations· and loan associations);
Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Cou;twright, 1931), § 89-816 (sleeping car companies).
80
Wis. Stat. (1941), § 215.41.
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loan, railroad, and real estate corporations seems without a rational
basis. Service
. on one agency for all is preferable. The officer served can
appoint a depu.ty who will keep a complete record and file for all corporations. Greater assurance of proper service would thus be gained.
In view of the great diversity in the existing statutes where uniformity is much to be desired, a uniform statute is herewith proposed.
It provides that the secretary of state shall be the exclusive agent for
service of process. This seems to involve no hardship. It does distinguish, in this respect, between foreign and domestic corporations, but no
constitutional privilege is interfered with.
It is also desirable that the secretary of state make a return showing
the performance of his statutory duty. This device is useful to insure
certainty of service. The plaintiff has an opportunity to discover
whether service has been made and will have adequate remedies in case
of failure of the secretary to act.
An express provision for limitation of these actions affords definiteness and certainty. There is no occasion to distinguish in this regard between contracts and torts. Since obligations for taxes may not be discoverable within this period, ft may be wise to eliminate claims made
by the state from this provision for limitation.
APPENDIX
PROPOSED UNIFORM STATUTE FOR PROCESS ON FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS
The secretary of state and he only shall be the agent for service of process for
every foreign corporation which carries on business within this state. Such service shall
be applicable to all causes of action arising within this state but not to causes arising
elsewhere. Such corporation shall be liable to suit for a period of four years after the
withdrawal of the corporation from the state, and no longer, unless the applicable
statute of limitations shall have run prior to its withdrawal. The above limitation of
actions shall not apply to claims made by the state.
It shall be the duty of such corporation, before doing any business in this state, to
file with the secretary of state the exact name under which it does business and its post
office address.
The plaintiff shall cause to be served two copies of its complaint, together with
two copies of the summons, upon the secretary of state. It shall be the duty of the said
secretary to forward immediately, by registered mail, one copy of the complaint, together with a copy of the summons, to the corporation at its post office address as
shown by information on file with the secretary. The process server shall make the
usual return to the court and in addition the secretary of state shall make a return to
the court where the action is brought, showing that the acts herein required to be performed by him have been done. Jurisdiction over defendant shall not attach until
such return by the secretary is filed.
The secretary of state shall keep a proper file of all complaints, together with the

'
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summons served upon him, and he shall enter on his record the action taken by him
respecting the service made upon him in each case. His return to the court of his
actiqn taken shall be conclusive as between the parties but shall not protect him in an
action for damages, by any party aggrieved, in case of his dereliction of duty in this
regard.
·
For such service, the complainant against any foreign corporation shall pay to the
secretary of state the sum of $5.oo at the time the service of summons is made. The
net fees so received shall be covered into the state treasury after deducting the actual
costs involved· by the performance of his duties as agent for service.
It shall be the duty of each foreign corporation, upon withdrawal from the state,
to inform the secretary of this fact in writing and the above statute of limitations shall
not run until this information is supplied.

